
On the Indecisiveness of KellyStrategyproof Social Choice Functions
Social choice functions (SCFs) map the preferences of a group of agents ...
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Arrovian Aggregation of Convex Preferences and Pairwise Utilitarianism
We consider social welfare functions that satisfy Arrow's classic axioms...
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AND Testing and Robust Judgement Aggregation
A function f{0,1}^n→{0,1} is called an approximate ANDhomomorphism if c...
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Refining Tournament Solutions via Margin of Victory
Tournament solutions are frequently used to select winners from a set of...
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The Satisfiability Problem for Boolean Set Theory with a Choice Correspondence
Given a set U of alternatives, a choice (correspondence) on U is a contr...
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Social Choice with Non Quasilinear Utilities
Without monetary payments, the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem proves that...
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FalseNameProof Facility Location on Discrete Structures
We consider the problem of locating a single facility on a vertex in a g...
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Characterizing the Top Cycle via Strategyproofness
Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only singlevalued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy nonimposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain) and strategyproofness (i.e., voters are never better off by misrepresenting their preferences) are dictatorships. In this paper, we consider setvalued social choice correspondences (SCCs) that are strategyproof according to Fishburn's preference extension and, in particular, the top cycle, an attractive SCC that returns the maximal elements of the transitive closure of the weak majority relation. Our main theorem implies that, under mild conditions, the top cycle is the only nonimposing strategyproof SCC whose outcome only depends on the quantified pairwise comparisons between alternatives. This result effectively turns the GibbardSatterthwaite impossibility into a complete characterization of the top cycle by moving from SCFs to SCCs. It is obtained as a corollary of a more general characterization of strategyproof SCCs.
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